Seventh Circuit Holds Text Messages Are Not “Telephone Calls” for Private TCPA Do-Not-Call Claims

On July 14, 2026, the Seventh Circuit issued its long-awaited decision in a case captioned Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services (consolidated with Jones v. Blackstone Medical Services) and held that text messages are not “telephone calls” for purposes of a Do-Not-Call claim under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). The ruling is the first appellate-level decision on this hotbed issue and gives businesses a significant, though simultaneously limited, defense to federal Do-Not-Call text-message claims.

McLaughlin Set the Stage

For years, TCPA litigants often treated FCC interpretations as effectively controlling in private litigation, including on questions such as whether text messages should be treated as “calls.” That changed with the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., which held that the Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. District courts must instead independently interpret the TCPA under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, while giving the FCC’s views only “appropriate respect.”

That shift is turning once-settled TCPA assumptions into live litigation issues. Issues that had often been treated as resolved by FCC rulings, including whether texts are “calls,” now may be decided court by court and jurisdiction by jurisdiction until appellate consensus emerges.

The District Court’s Ruling

The case arose from a consolidated class action alleging that Blackstone Medical Services sent marketing text messages and calls promoting home sleep tests, including after consumers allegedly replied “STOP” or placed their numbers on the National Do-Not-Call Registry. The plaintiffs asserted TCPA claims under section 227(c)(5) and related FCC regulations, along with a Florida Telephone Solicitation Act claim. Blackstone moved to dismiss the TCPA claims, arguing that section 227(c)(5) covers unwanted “telephone call[s]” but not text messages.

The district court agreed. Applying McLaughlin and Loper Bright, the court interpreted the TCPA directly and held that section 227(c)(5) refers to “telephone call,” does not mention “text message” or “SMS message” and does not define “telephone call” to include texts. Although the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ reading was reasonable given the TCPA’s purpose and the prevalence of texting, it concluded that the better reading was that section 227(c)(5) does not regulate text messages, dismissed the federal TCPA claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining Florida law claim.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit affirmed, framing the appeal as a single statutory question: whether text messages are “telephone calls” within the meaning of section 227(c)(5). Applying ordinary public meaning at the time of enactment and the surrounding statutory context, the court held that texts are not calls and that section 227(c)(5) does not authorize a private suit based on unwanted text messages.

The panel’s analysis was textual and structural. Section 227(c)(5) creates a private right of action for receiving more than one “telephone call” within a 12-month period, and the court reasoned that phrase could not have been understood in 1991 to include text messages because the first text message was not sent until 1992. Contemporaneous dictionary definitions reinforced that conclusion because they tied “telephone” and “call” to sound-based communication, while text messages do not reproduce sound. The court also found it meaningful that other parts of section 227(c) refer more broadly to “telephone solicitations,” defined to include a “telephone call or message,” while section 227(c)(5) creates a private right only for “telephone call[s].”

The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on FCC interpretations and prior decisions treating texts as calls in other TCPA contexts. The panel explained that Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez assumed, but did not decide, whether texts are calls, and that other Supreme Court, Seventh Circuit and circuit decisions arose under section 227(b), not section 227(c)(5). And after McLaughlin, the FCC’s contrary treatment of texts did not control because the court had to interpret the statute for itself.

Finally, the court rejected policy arguments based on the TCPA’s remedial purpose. Although repeated unwanted texts are a nuisance, the court held that they do not fall within section 227(c)(5)’s private right of action and noted that spam messages may still be addressed through agency action under other parts of section 227.

Key Takeaways

• The immediate takeaway is significant. In the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs may not pursue section 227(c)(5) private right of action claims based solely on unwanted text messages, because that provision covers telephone calls, not texts. That is an important defense for Do-Not-Call text cases.
• But companies should not treat Steidinger as permission to loosen telemarketing compliance practices. Unsolicited marketing calls and texts remain risky. TCPA-compliant consent remains the best practice, and the decision does not eliminate risk under other TCPA provisions or under state law.
• The outcome also could change or diverge elsewhere. The plaintiffs may seek further review, and other circuits may read section 227(c)(5) differently, particularly after McLaughlin made independent statutory interpretation the governing approach. TCPA defendants will be watching to see whether other circuits follow the Seventh Circuit or whether the issue ultimately reaches the Supreme Court, which has recently narrowed TCPA exposure in decisions such as Facebook v. Duguid and reshaped TCPA litigation through McLaughlin.
• State law remains a separate and important layer of risk. The Steidinger plaintiffs also asserted a Florida Telephone Solicitation Act claim, and the federal courts’ dismissal of the TCPA claims did not resolve that state law theory on the merits. Several states have enacted mini-TCPA or telemarketing laws that impose requirements beyond federal law, including different consent rules, calling or texting windows, state Do-Not-Call lists, penalties and treatment of text messages.
• For now, businesses should view telemarketing compliance through a state-by-state and jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction lens. Steidinger is an important defense decision, but until a stable consensus emerges, companies using SMS marketing should maintain robust compliance programs, including keeping records of consent, honoring opt-outs promptly, scrubbing against applicable Do-Not-Call lists and accounting for federal and state requirements wherever campaigns are directed.