You Can’t Always Get What You Want: The PTAB’s “Software Per Se” Shortcut Gets Reversed

The Federal Circuit’s decision in In re McFadden offers important clarifications for drafters of computer implemented system claims that incorporate actions or functional capabilities. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB or Board) cannot turn a system claim into a method claim simply because the system is “configured to” perform a method. Nor should calling a claim “software per se” automatically end the patent-eligibility inquiry. The decision offers two reminders for patent practitioners: functional capability language is not inherently indefinite, and computer-implemented inventions deserve an eligibility analysis grounded in the claim and the disclosed structure.

The claims at issue involve an information-exchange system in which a subsystem determined an included region for information flow. Claim 10 recited the following:

  • 10. A social network system, comprising:
    • a post or other equivalent information item from a first user of the social network;
    • a subsystem configured to use the method of claim 1 to determine an include[d] region for a second user of the social network; [and]
    • a module capable of using the include[d] region to determine inclusion of the post into a news feed or equivalent information stream directed to the second user.

The Board concluded that the language “configured to use the method of claim 1” required the actual practice of method steps, and, therefore, the claim recited mixed statutory classes. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and held the opposite:

  • The language “configured to” in the claims indicates that the subsystem must be capable of using the claimed method. The Board incorrectly found that the claims “recite practicing the method steps.” ... Properly read, the claims do not require performance of the method steps.

The court explained that “the claims are limited to a system or apparatus possessing the recited structure and capable of performing the recited functions.” In addition, the claims recited permitted functional language to describe the capabilities of the claimed system. Accordingly, the court reversed the Board’s § 112(b) indefiniteness holding.

The court also rejected the Board’s threshold § 101 conclusion that the claims were “software per se.” The court agreed that the claim term “subsystem” is a nonce word invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but that the specification disclosed sufficient structure—including servers, CPUs, embedded processors, virtual machines and other hardware—to establish the requisite structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). The court explained that the specification described a system that could operate as a “subsystem” and elaborated on different structures including one or more physical computer hardware systems, servers, devices, CPUs, virtual devices and virtual machines. According to the court:

Because the specification discloses structure that corresponds to the recited subsystem—i.e., a computer system running software—we conclude that . . . the claims recite tangible structure and fall within one of the statutorily provided categories.

The court therefore held that the Board improperly halted its § 101 analysis after labeling the claims “software per se,” vacated the § 101 rejection and remanded for reconsideration.

Practical Implications for Patent Drafters

McFadden reinforces several drafting principles that align with best practices:

  1. “Configured to” remains safe and effective in system claims.
    If the claim recites a system “configured to” perform a method, it is interpreted as describing a capability, not the performance of a method step.
  2. Cross-referencing method claims does not convert a system claim into a mixed-method claim.
    The Court confirmed that a system “configured to use the method of claim 1” is permissible.
  3. Nonce terms are permissible if the specification discloses adequate structure.
    While 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) applied, the specification’s hardware disclosure was sufficient to avoid both indefiniteness and “software per se” treatment.
  4. Include structural anchors in software-oriented claims.
    The court confirmed that disclosure of generic hardware—CPUs, servers, memory—is adequate to satisfy the statutory category requirement at the 35 U.S.C. § 101 threshold stage. However, disclosure of specific hardware and/or software and technical advantages may still be needed to overcome the ultimate test under § 101.

Practical Implications for Litigators

  1. Frame indefiniteness disputes around performance versus capability.
    Litigators should require opponents to identify where the claim affirmatively requires execution of method steps, rather than accepting conclusory “mixed class” arguments.
  2. Use McFadden early to blunt indefiniteness attacks.
    The decision is particularly effective against reasoning that treats “configured to” claim language as actual method practice.
  3. Anticipate § 112(f) fallback arguments—and use them strategically.
    Where a term like “subsystem” is arguably a nonce term, McFadden shows that invoking § 112(f) is not fatal if the specification discloses sufficient structure. Litigators defending validity should be prepared to pivot: even if § 112(f) applies, the claim still survives when structural disclosure is present.
  4. Leverage McFadden to reopen prematurely terminated § 101 analyses.
    The decision is useful when the PTAB or a district court short-circuits § 101 by labeling claims “software per se.” McFadden supports arguments that software running on a computer system, where the specification discloses servers, CPUs, embedded processors, virtual machines, and other hardware, may be sufficient structure for the claims to be patent eligible and definite.

Conclusion

McFadden does not guarantee that software-oriented claims will survive every indefiniteness or eligibility challenge. It does, however, caution against shortcuts. Patent drafters should anchor claimed functions in adequate structural disclosures and explain the invention’s technical implementation and technical benefits. You can’t always get the claim scope you want, but the analysis should at least be based on the claim you wrote and the technical implementation and benefits.


is a partner in Manatt’s Intellectual Property Protection and Enforcement business unit and is the author of Patent Prosecution: Law, Practice, and Procedure, 2025 Edition, and Constructing and Deconstructing Patents (2nd Edition).

In re McFadden, Civ. App. 2024-2107, 2025 WL 2553720 (Fed. Cir. September 5, 2025) (unpublished).

Id., slip op. at 2.

Id., slip op. at 10.

Id., slip op. at 8.