Employer Can’t Shorten Congress’s Timeline Under Title VII, ADEA

May private parties prospectively shorten the time Congress gives employees to sue their employers under Title VII or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)?

No, the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held, joining the Sixth Circuit to rule that judicial enforcement of such agreements would disrupt the relevant statutes’ carefully integrated and uniform remedial schemes.

When she started working for EOTech, Natalie Thomas signed an EOTech-drafted document that included language purporting to shorten the time she would otherwise have to sue the employer for any disputes “relating to her employment.”

Specifically, it decreased the time period to sue to 180 days, including for discrimination claims.

EOTech fired Thomas. She filed a charge of discrimination with both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights. When she received her right-to-sue letter, Thomas sued EOTech in federal district court, alleging violations of Title VII, the ADEA and the Maryland Fair Employment Practice Act (MFEPA).

In response, EOTech filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the lawsuit was untimely under the employment agreement because 196 countable days had lapsed (106 days from termination to filing an EEOC charge plus an additional 90 days after receiving notice from the EEOC).

The court converted the motion to one for summary judgment and granted it, concluding that the parties had validly shortened Thomas’s timeframe to sue through the agreement.

Thomas appealed, and the court reversed with regard to her federal claims under Title VII and the ADEA.

“Congress has created for both statutes an intricate remedial scheme that requires an employee to first seek assistance from government agencies and grants those agencies considerable power over when (and even if) the employee may bring her own suit,” the court wrote.

The court walked through the process and all of its deadlines, from filing a charge with the EEOC, the agency’s investigation and decision to file suit, possibly allowing the employee to file suit or to use informal methods such as conference, conciliation or persuasion.

Similar, but simpler, enforcement provisions are found in the ADEA.

“The timing rules described above strike a ‘delicate balance’ between competing goals,” the court explained. “Like all limitation periods, they reflect Congress’s weight of various interests - most obviously, society’s interest in deterring and remedying unlawful discrimination versus employers’ interest in not having to defend against (or remain prepared to defend against) stale claims.”

In addition, the procedural and timing rules reflect Congress’s decision to rely upon a combination of public and private enforcement, the court said, as well as the legislative choice to favor a uniform and nationwide enforcement system.

“The inevitable - indeed, the only - impact of the [employment agreement] is to shorten the total time Thomas would have to complete two tasks: file a charge with the EEOC, and after the proceedings conclude, file a private lawsuit,” the court said, amounting to “180 days to do two things that both Title VII and the ADEA would otherwise have given her at least 270 days to do.”

EOTech told the court that Thomas should have hired a lawyer to prepare a lawsuit while her charge was still pending before the EEOC in order to satisfy the agreement’s timelines.

But that suggestion “cannot be squared with Congress’s choice to make ‘cooperation and voluntary compliance … the preferred means for achieving the goal of equality of employment opportunities,’” the court added.

The court was careful to limit the scope of its opinion.

“We need not - and thus do not - decide whether (and if so, when) private parties may ever prospectively shorten by contract the statutory period for suing on a federal statutory claim,” the court wrote. “Instead, we hold only that the district court erred in dismissing Thomas’s suit because parties may not by advance agreement render untimely a suit that would otherwise be timely under Title VII or the ADEA.”

However, state law governed Thomas’s MFEPA claims. Maryland law permits parties to modify time limitations, provided there is no controlling statute to the contrary. It is reasonable, and it is not subject to other defenses (such as fraud, duress or misrepresentation).

Therefore, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of EOTech on Thomas’s state law claims.

To read the opinion Thomas v. EOTech, LLC, click .

Why it matters: The Fourth Circuit refused to contradict the “intricate remedial scheme” created by Congress with regard to both Title VII and the ADEA, relying upon the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino for support.