Reversing Dismissal, First Circuit Emphasizes Broad Interpretation of ADA

Summary judgment in favor of an employer was reversed after the First U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals provided a reminder that a “disability” is to be construed broadly under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA).

Jesse Sutherland began working as a service technician for Peterson’s Oil Service in August 2019. He injured his knee in October, tearing his meniscus in two places and damaging his patella.

Sutherland requested to shorten his workday and often had to end his shift early because his knee was swollen. He took a 12-week leave of absence to undergo knee surgery and recover.

When he tried to return to work, he did not receive a response. During discovery, he was provided with a letter that stated his termination was “due to lack of work during the COVID-19 pandemic.”

Sutherland filed suit against Peterson’s, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA, as well as Massachusetts state law claims alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate.

Peterson’s moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion.

Sutherland appealed. He argued that Peterson’s failed to accommodate his disability while he worked for the company, then terminated him because of this past disability and/or in retaliation for him seeking a modified work schedule.

“We conclude that the district court, in granting summary judgment to Peterson’s, overlooked the operative standards under the ADA in evaluating whether Sutherland had provided sufficient evidence to establish that his knee injury qualified as a disability,” the federal appellate panel wrote. “Similarly, we determine that the court did not fully credit the legal independence of the retaliation and failure to accommodate claims.”

The First Circuit began with the familiar three-part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework that governs disability discrimination claims, focusing on the issue of whether Sutherland put forward enough evidence to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.

Under the ADA, a disability includes “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” “a record of such impairment,” or “being regarded as having such an impairment,” the court explained. The ADAAA and accompanying regulations implement this broad scope of protection, making clear that an injury need not be permanent or long term to be considered sufficiently severe.

The district court held that Sutherland’s injury did not qualify as a disability as a matter of law because it was only a temporary injury, and his evidentiary support consisted of a doctor’s note and his own statements.

But that ruling was inconsistent with the statute and precedent, the court said.

“Congress expressly rejected previous Supreme Court precedent and concluded that a temporary injury can qualify as a disability if it is sufficiently severe,” the court said. “Further, there is ‘no per se rule about either the type or quantum of evidence’ a plaintiff needs to establish that an impairment exists. … Medical evidence also is not always necessary to prove that an impairment constitutes a ‘substantial limitation’ on a major life activity.”

The court noted that, on remand, the district court would need to consider the second and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas framework, specifically whether Peterson’s put forward a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing Sutherland and whether Sutherland introduced sufficient evidence to show that the proffered reason—business slowdown during the COVID-19 pandemic—was pretextual.

As for the retaliation claim, the First Circuit remanded for the district court to consider its merits under the McDonnell Douglas framework, separate from the discrimination claim. 

Finally, Sutherland’s failure to accommodate claim also got new life, as the court remanded with instructions to the district court to consider whether Peterson’s actions amounted to a failure to engage in the interactive process contemplated by Massachusetts law, and whether that failure was itself a violation of anti-discrimination law or at least evidence that Peterson’s was acting unreasonably.

To read the opinion in Sutherland v. Peterson’s Oil Service, Inc., click .

Why it matters: The First Circuit took pains to emphasize the “broad scope of protection” under the ADA and ADAAA, explaining that a temporary injury can qualify as a disability and that no per se rule about either the type or quantum of evidence provided by a plaintiff to establish an impairment exists.